Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 20, Issue 2

1996

Article 2

Czech Constitutional Democracy: Focus on
the Czech Dual Executive Power and the
Future Senate
Jack Van Doren∗

Thomas Magstadt†

∗
†

Copyright c 1996 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Czech Constitutional Democracy: Focus on
the Czech Dual Executive Power and the
Future Senate
Jack Van Doren and Thomas Magstadt

Abstract
The main focus of this Essay is the potential dynamic tension in the Czech dual executive
power. The Czech presidency, presently occupied by the former dissident Vaclav Havel, is commonly perceived in the Czech Republic as a weak presidency. If it is true that President Havel’s
office can justifiably be described as weak, is this due to Constitutional restraints on the presidency,
or is it a function of the personality of the current occupant of the presidency? This Essay also
discusses the implications of the November 15-16, 1996 Senate elections on the Czech democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
The main focus of this Essay is the potential dynamic tension in the Czech dual executive power. The Czech presidency,
presently occupied by the former dissident Vaclav Havel, is commonly perceived in the Czech Republic as a weak presidency. If
it is true that President Havel's office can justifiably be described
as weak, is this due to Constitutional restraints on the presidency, or is it a function of the personality of the current occupant of the presidency? This Essay also discusses the implications of the November 15-16, 1996 Senate elections on the Czech
democracy.
I. HISTORICAL BACKDROP
Historically, the Czechs and Slovaks stand alone among the
Slavic nations in having had direct experience in democratic
self-government prior to World War 11.1 The Czechs and Slovaks
have characteristically been ruled by foreign empires, described
by one writer as alien, ruthless, and oppressive dictatorships.'
Prior to World War I, the Austrian Hapsburgs, an externally
* Professor of Law, Florida State University, AB. Harvard College, 1956, LL.B Yale
Law School, 1959.

** Formerly Professor at the University of Nebraska, Kearney; Ph.D. in International Studies, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1972; undergraduate B.A. Augustana College (Sioux Falls) 1966.
1. See STEPHEN BORSODY, THE TRAGEDY OF CENTRAL EUROPE, NAZI AND SOVIET CON54 (1980); CZECHOSLOVAKIA, A COUNTRY STUDY xix (Richard F.

QUEST AND AFTERMATH

Nyrop ed., 1982) [hereinafter Nyrop] (stating that between world wars I and II Czechoslovakia was most democratic, libertarian, and tolerant society in Central Europe).
2. See Nyrop, supra note 1, at xix.
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based autocracy, ruled the territory of the Czech Republic for a
continuous period of more than three centuries from the sixteenth century3 until the collapse of the war torn Hapsburg Empire in 1918. After the Industrial Revolution, what is now the
Czech Republic became the center of the Austro-Hungarian industrial empire. 4
During the nineteenth century, the latter period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the cultural groundwork was laid for the
forthcoming Czech and Slovak state through a national revival of
Czech language and culture. 5 Thus, upon the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I, the Czechs and Slovaks
formed a nation state, known as Czechoslovakia. 6 The Constitution of 1920 formalized the relationship, 7 setting the stage for an
interwar period of democracy and market-oriented development. Thus, between the two world wars, the new, independent
state of Czechoslovakia had gained the well-deserved reputation
as the showcase of democracy in Slavic Europe under the strong
and steady leadership of President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk.
The Czechoslovakian democracy, during the interwar period,
was one of the most developed countries in Eastern Europe and
possessed an industry that was world renowned for superior quality goods.9 This scenario was interrupted in 1938,1° following
the now infamous Munich meeting, in which part of Czechoslovakia was ceded to Germany. In 1939, Hitler's Germany annexed Czechoslovakia."
Following this were the calamitous
3. See id. at 3. The Czech Bohemian Kingdom is described as being part of the
Austrian half of the Hapsburg Empire from 1526. Id.
4. See Carol M. Welu, The Czech Republic Goes Its Own Way, LEGAL TIMES, April 12,
1993, at 32-33 (stating that three-fourths of Austro-Hungarian Empire's industry is in
what is now Czech Republic).
5. See Nyrop, supra note 1, at 21-22.
6. See Roberta Barbieri, Czechoslovakia's Movement Toward a New Constitution: The
Challenge of Establishinga Democratic MultinationalState, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Irr'L. & COMP.
L. 99, 102-04 (1992).

7. See id. at 104;

MILTON ANDREW, TWELVE LEADING CONSTITUTIONS

5-38 (1931)

(providing text of 1920 Constitution).
8. See H. GORDON SKuItaNG, T.G. MAsARYK 172 (1994) (stating that Masaryk returned to Czech lands and was elected President in 1918); OTro ULC, THE JUDGE IN A
COMMUNIST STATE, A VIEW FROM WITHIN XII (1972).
9. See Heather Weibel, Avenues for Investment in the Former Czechoslovakia: Privatization and the HistoricalDevelopment of the New Commercial Code, 18 DELAWAREJ. OF CORP. L.
889, 890 (1993).

10. See Nyrop, supra note 1, at xix.
11. See id. at 3.
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years of German-Nazi occupation during World War II.
Six years later, in 1945, Germany lost World War II and Russian troops liberated Czechoslovakia from the Germans in the
East. U.S. troops liberated the country from the West as far as
Plzen. 12 When independent statehood was restored in 1945,
there was a short lived revival of democratic rule. From 1945 to
1948, Communist political forces formed a strong power base in
the Czech Government." Communists gained control of the
Government, Prime Ministry, by winning thirty-eight percent of
the popular vote in a 1946 election.1 4 The final push for power
in 1948 assumed the form of a coup d'etat.'5 In 1948, the Com16
munist takeover brought a Communist dictatorship to power.
Moscow, an outside power, encouraged and underwrote the dictatorship and forcibly reimposed it in 1968.17
The Communists subsequently ruled for more than fortyone years from 1948 to 1989. In the 1960s, the Dub~ek regime
attempted a liberalization, known as the Prague Spring, which
Moscow found unacceptable. Consequently, Moscow restored
socialist solidarity with Russian tanks in 1968.18 Following the
Prague Spring, passive resistance may have increased. It was observed that workers did only the absolute minimum of work to
avoid dismissal, while absenteeism and alcoholism were rampant.19

In 1977, a protest petition signed by numerous dissidents
appeared and became known as the Charter 77.20 Vaclav Havel

and others led a protest which began only as a demand for
greater freedom, but gave rise to the "Velvet Revolution." The
Velvet Revolution was a startling, almost incredibly peaceful
transfer of power from the ruling Communists to liberal democrats. In the beginning of the 1990s, free and open elections
were held, and a multiparty Parliament was elected in which
12. See id. at 208.

13. Id. at 3.
14. See id. at 46, 47.

15. Id. at 210.
16. See id. at xix, 210.
17. Id. at xix-xxi.
18. Id. at xx, xxi.
19. See id. at xxii, xxv (explaining that people received wages, not for work, but for
going to work).
20. See id. at xxii-xxiii, 235 (stating that several hundred citizens who signed Charter 77 were subject to severe reprisals).
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Vaclav Klaus came to power as Prime Minister. Prime Minister
Klaus came to power 2' on a platform of radical free-market reforms modeled after the policies of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The Parliament selected Vaclav Havel as President.
In 1992, difficulties between Czechs and Slovaks came to the
fore. What followed was the "Velvet Divorce", the division of
Czechoslovakia into two separate and independent states, effective January 1, 1993.22 There are strong historical reasons for
the incompatibility of the Czechs and Slovaks: different religions such as Roman Catholic Slovaks and iconoclastic Czechs,
the contrast of heavily industrialized Czech lands contrasted with
a largely agrarian Slovakia, and Slovak grievances over Czech
dominance, paternalism, and feelings of superiority.2 3 Nonetheless, a majority of the Slovaks did not want the separation.2 4
President Havel made valiant attempts to mediate the dispute,
which ultimately failed as the Czechs and Slovaks formed independent states. President Havel sought, unsuccessfully, to circumvent a Parliament which became committed to separation,
by trying to obtain power to call a referendum on the separation
issue.25 When it became clear that these reconciliation efforts
would not be successful, Havel resigned as President, refusing to
preside over the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.2 6
After the split between the Czechs and Slovaks, the Czechs
found themselves needing a new Constitution. The drafters of
the Czech Constitution used the Czechoslovakian 1920 Constitution as a model.2 7 The U.S. Constitution was reportedly the
model for the 1920 Constitution. 28 The current Czech Constitution, adopted in 1992, is at first blush a reassuring document.
For example, the protection of property rights and the general
21. See Welu, supra note 4, at 33 (stating that Vaclav Klaus is among most conservative leaders in Eastern Europe).
22. Id. at 32.
23. See Barbieri, supra note 6, at 101, 102, 105, 107.
24. See id. at 121 (discussing poll indicating that only 19% of Slovaks wanted separation).
25. Id. at 119.
26. See id. at 123.

27. See Vojtech Cepl, ConstitutionalReform in the Czech Republic, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 29,
32 (1993).
28. See Nyrop, supra note 1, at 28, 158 (indicating that Masaryk modelled 1920
Constitution on U.S. Constitution).
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democratic nature of the Constitution may reassure potential
Western investors. The Constitution also offers a broad spectrum of human rights guarantees, and it is admirably concise.
There is, however, a potential for dissonance and conflict built
into the Czech Constitution in the composition of a dual executive. This Essay does not mean to suggest that the capacity for
dissonance and conflict is peculiar to the Czech democracy.
Taking the U.S. Constitution as an example, the democratic
ideas of separation of powers and checks and balances necessarily involves the potentiality of conflict and deadlock.
II. PROVISIONS FOR PRESIDENCY AND PARLIAMENT
The Czech Constitution of 1992 established a dual executive
within a parliamentary system. While the president is the designated official to appoint the prime minister, the ultimate authority for the selection rests with the House of Deputies, which can
accept or reject the president's choice. The president's power to
dismiss the prime minister arises only if there is first a vote which
indicates lack of confidence in the House of Deputies.
The constitutional provisions which create the dual executive do so by providing a series of powers which require the joint
approval of the president and the prime minister. Thus, there
results a dual executive with the president as head of state and
the prime minister as head of the government. The drafters of
the Czech Constitution apparently wanted to establish a dual executive in which both the president and prime minister would
be armed with powerful weapons to influence, but not dictate,
significant parts of legislation and public policy. Due to the
shared distribution of executive powers, there is a troubling potential for deadlock.
The 1992 Czech Constitution also sets up a bicameral legislature, but due to political maneuvering and intrigue, the necessary implementation to elect and put in place the upper house,
or Senate, did not occur until the end of 1995. The final creation of the Senate after the November 15-16, 1996 elections is a
fitting resolution of the problem of the missing Senate which was
raising disturbing questions about the rule of law in the Czech
Republic.
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III. IS THE CZECH PRESIDENCY WEAK?
The Czech presidency is perceived in the Czech Republic to
lack effective power. Czech students indicated in papers and
orally that they considered the presidency of the Czech Republic
weak. On the other hand, President Havel often seems to outsiders to be a model president. He is better known outside the
Czech Republic than Vaclav Klaus, the Prime Minister, who actually has wielded the most effective power in the Czech Republic
in the day-to-day running of the country. Abroad, President
Havel projects an abiding mantel of moral authority and legitimacy. The situation at home, however, seems quite different.
He is widely regarded as an ineffectual person who is unable to
translate his policies into government action. To some Czechs,
President Havel appears to be whistling in the wind, moralizing
in a vacuum. Thus, the Czechs, pragmatic and practical, tend to
see President Havel's attempts at moral arbitration, often without noticeable effect, as worthy of derision if not contempt.
Commentators, however, perceive presidential power as "significant."12 9 Suggesting that there is a happy resolution and sufficient power in the executive, one commentator concludes that
the executive power is well balanced between the president and
30
the government.
The situation is that the current Czech president is perceived as weak internally, but as possessing adequate or even substantial powers. This raises the following question: Is the weakness inherent in the constitutional powers of the presidency or is
it due to the role that the current president assigns himself and,
thus, a function of his particular personality, or both?
IV. THE CZECH PRESIDENCY-EVOLUTION
A. Summary
For perspective, we turn to the Czech Constitution of 1920,
to compare or contrast the powers of the presidency. The presidency in the 1920 Constitution did not contain as many powers
as the U.S. presidency, 3' but afforded more power to the presi29. See Cepl, supra note 27, at 33.
30. See George E. Glos, The Constitution of the Czech Republic of 1992, 21 HASrINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1049, 1053 (1994).
31. UST. ZAK. tSFR (Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic) [hereinafter 1920 Constitution].
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dent than the 1992 Constitution. According to the 1920 Constitution, the president was to be elected by the National Assembly,
comprised of both houses of Parliament.12 Tomas Masaryk, the
first President, had substantially greater constitutional power
than the power granted to presidents in the 1992 Constitution.
The main constitutional advantage that Masaryk possessed was
the power to appoint and dismiss ministers at wills3 and the right
to dissolve Parliament except during the last six months of the
presidential term. 4 Similar to the 1992 Constitution, the 1920
Constitution allowed the Parliament to vote the Government out
with a vote of no confidence3 - and allowed the President to then
select a new Government. 36 President Havel then, cannot dismiss ministers unless the Parliament passes a vote of no confidence. The House of Deputies must then approve the president's choice of prime minister.
While presidential acts may require a co-signature from the
appropriate government official in both the 1920 and 1992 Constitutions, there is a major difference; the ministers in Masaryk's
Government served at his pleasure, while in the present Government the ministers, proposed by the prime minister and only
formally appointed by the president, serve at the pleasure of the
prime minister. In other words, President Masaryk had the
power to make and break governments, a power the current
president does not have.
Under the 1992 Czech Constitution, the president of the
Czech Republic is elected by the Parliament for a five-year term
and may be re-elected only once. 7 In rejecting the idea of a
popularly elected president, the Constitution of the Czech Republic differs from most others in Eastern Europe. 8 Vaclav
Klaus, who was the Prime Minister at the time of the Constitution's drafting, argued that a popularly elected president would
create an undesirable imbalance of power because the president
32. Id. arts. 38, 56.
33. See 1920 Constitution art. 64(7) (empowering President to appoint, dismiss,
and fix number of ministers).
34. See id. art. 31(1)-(2).
35. Id. art. 75.
36. Id. art. 78.
37. See US'TAVA (tR (Constitution of the Czech Republic) arts. 54(2), 55 (1992).
38. See Cepl, supra note 27, at 33; see, e.g., Romanian Constitution of 1991, art. 81
(providing for popularly elected president).
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would be too powerful.3 9 Therefore, it may be deemed misleading to maintain, as at least one commentator does, that the provisions concerning executive power are similar in the two Czech
Constitutions of 1920 and 1992. 0
B. Executive Power under the 1992 Constitution Compared to the
1920 Constitution
1. Appointment of Ministers
Under the 1992 Constitution, the president appoints and
recalls the prime minister and the government and convenes the
Chamber of Deputies or lower house.4" The president may recall Parliament only after the Chamber of Deputies initiates such
action by failing to pass a measure which the government has
publicly declared it considers a matter of confidence or passing a
no-confidence vote "by a majority of more than one-half of all
the deputies."4" Thus, the Czech president does not have the
unfettered power to appoint and dismiss ministers at his discretion, or the power to dissolve Parliament on his own, which Masaryk possessed from the 1920 Constitution. Subject to approval
by the Chamber of Deputies, the president appoints the prime
minister.4 " The president appoints and recalls the other ministers but only upon the proposal of the prime minister." President Masaryk had the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime
Minister and other ministers. In the 1992 Constitution, however, the Chamber of Deputies or its chairman has the virtual
power to select the prime minister. Thus, while the president in
the first instance makes the appointment, if the Chamber of
Deputies fails to approve the president's choice of prime minister after two attempts, the president must appoint the prime
minister proposed by the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies.45
39. See Cepl, supra note 27, at 33.
40. See Glos, supra note 30, at 1053.
41. OSTAVA tR (Constitution of the Czech Republic) art. 62(a)-(b) [hereinafter
1992 Constitution].
42. Id. arts. 35(1)(b), 72. To initiate a no-confidence vote, the Chamber of Deputies must submit a petition signed by at least 50 of its members. Id.
43. Id. arts. 68(2)-(4).
44. Id. arts. 68(2), 68(5).
45. Id. art. 68(4).
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2. Other Presidential Powers

While the president's powers in the 1992 Constitution appear sweeping, in most cases they require the concurrence of
another source, most often the prime minister. The Constitution of 1992 provides, " [ d] ecisions by the President of the Republic made in accordance with Paragraphs (1) and (2) require
for their validity the cosignature of the Prime Minister or another member of the government entrusted by him."' In other
words, the president's hands can be effectively tied in the exercise of all the powers enumerated in Article 63 if the prime minister chooses to tie them. While there is a similar provision in
the 1920 Constitution requiring a minister's approval for the executive decisions of Masaryk, the effect of the provision is different. For if Masaryk did not get approval for some program of his
by a relevant ministry official, he could dismiss the minister or
the government. Again, President Havel has no such power.
Presidential power to appoint and promote generals, 4 7 to
appoint judges,4" and to grant amnesty,4 9 require the concurrence of the prime minister.5 0 The president, as head of state,
represents the Czech Republic to the international community,
but the power to conclude and ratify international treaties, is a
concurrent power, 51 as is the president's power as "supreme
commander of the armed forces."52 The president appears to
have impressive powers of judicial intervention as well, such as
issuance of pardons, reduction of and preemption of penalties,
discontinuance of criminal proceedings, and nullification of
53
punishments.
The President does not have a veto but can refer a bill back
46. Id. art. 63(3).
47. Id. art. 6 3 (1)(g).
48. Id. art. 63(1)(i).
49. Id. art. 63(1)(j).
50. Id. art. 63.
51. Id.art. 63(1)(a)-(b).
52. Id. art. 63 (1) (c). The president's power to choose members of the Constitutional Court under Article 62(e) is subject to the approval of the Senate under Article
84(2). Id. The president appoints the two top officers of the Supreme Control Office
and the members of the Banking Council of the Czech National Bank on the proposal
of the Chamber of Deputies. Id. arts. 62 (j)-(k), 97(2). The president has the exclusive
power to appoint the chairman and deputy chairman of the Supreme Court. Id. art.
62(f).
53. Id. art. 62(g).
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to the House if he or she disagrees with the bill. A majority of all
members of the House rather than a majority of members present is then required for passage.5 4 This provision could take on
more significance where, as now, the Prime Minister has a coalition government which can produce fragile alliances and where
one or two votes can be decisive.
3. Prime Minister as Seat of Power
The real substance of executive power appears to reside in
the prime minister and his ministers. The prime minister organizes the activity of the government, chairs its meetings, acts
on its behalf, and carries out the duties entrusted by the Constitution and law. 5 The 1992 Constitution states, "the government
is the supreme organ of executive power" [and] the government consists of the Prime Minister, deputy prime ministers and
ministers."5 7
4. Review
Another way to view the executive powers under the 1992
Czech Constitution is to recognize the ambiguities, which are
presumably deliberate, surrounding the president's role and
powers and the built-in tensions vis d vis the role and powers of
the prime minister. In fact, as noted at the outset, there is a dual
executive in the Czech Republic at the present time, one which
contrasts sharply with the U.S. executive branch and also with
that of France, where the French president has more extensive
formal powers and has been directly elected since the early
1960s.
V. WEAK PRESIDENCY OR MEEK PRESIDENT?
The dual executive is particularly relevant to an assessment
of the Czech perception of a weak presidency and to show potential for constitutional power struggles. For some observers, however, any critique of the inadequacies of the 1992 Constitution
and constitutionalism in the Czech Republic raises a serious
question about the role of the country's leading public personal54. Id. art. 50(2).
55. Id. art. 77(1).
56. Id. art. 67(1).

57. Id. art. 67(2).
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ity, President Vaclav Havel. The drafters did not intend to create
a strong president. The president is not directly elected, the
prime minister has the power to second-guess many important
presidential decisions, and the real power to dismiss Parliament
and appoint ministers is not in presidential hands.
Suppose, for example, that Vaclav Klaus were to become
president, and the unlikely event that President Havel were to
become prime minister. Would we see a stronger presidency
and a weaker government, in the sense of the prime minister
and his ministers? Would the presidency assume a more prominent stance if a modern day Masaryk were to become president?
It is possible that a person more attuned to what support is necessary to achieve political results might have secured a presidency with more unfettered power. Specifically, is the failure of
the Constitution to provide for a more powerful president attributable to the personal failing of President Havel himself?. President Havel's detractors have argued that his lack of political acumen is to blame for what they consider an excessively constrained or "weak" presidency. Masaryk, for example, obtained a
more powerful presidency, no doubt resulting from the fact that
he was considered comparable to a George Washington in his
stature and influence.58 It is difficult even to refute the argument that one more pragmatic than President Havel might have
obtained more powers for the presidency. If Klaus had aspired
to the presidency would it have been stronger? Who can confidently say no?
The personal factor should not be overlooked. The way the
presidency evolves often reflects the principles and predilections
of the most popular or highly respected figure in the land at the
time the constitution is drafted. Masaryk, for example, was described later as a figure of prestige and authority which placed
him above attacks. The people saw him as a liberator, an indispensable man who insured the unity of the state and the continuity of his policy. 59 Besides having greater power by virtue of
the 1920 Constitution, Masaryk exercised great power because of
the force of his personality, his perception of his role, his ability
58. See EDWARD NEWMAN, MASARYK, 192 (1960) (stating that Masaryk was thought
of as father of his country).
59. See WILLIAM MARTIN, STATESMEN OF THE WAR IN RETROSPECT, 1918-1928 279-80
(1970).
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and inclination to do so, and the people's need for him to do
so. 6 0 Masaryk guided day-to-day policy so that everything that
was done bore his touch.6 1 Masaryk heavily influenced some of
62
the ministers who served under him.
President Havel does not share the view that the president
ought to be a partisan politician. He views the presidency as a
position of moral authority with powers and prerogatives that
should be exercised to help guarantee continuity.63 President
Havel has settled into a relatively apolitical role of mediator,
moral arbitrator, and honest broker. The 1992 Czech Constitution does not clearly prescribe such a role, nor does it effectively
bar a president bent on running the political show from taking a
more active, assertive, or outright partisan approach if he or she
is so inclined. Notwithstanding President Havel's own personal
hands-off presidential style, there is sufficient grist for the mill in
Articles 54 to 66 of Chapter Three' of the 1992 Czech Constitution to permit a more active and ambitious politician to maneuver against the government or at least to induce a kind of governmental paralysis.
A popular, charismatic president, even one indirectly
elected such as Masaryk, could always use the high visibility of
60. See NEwMAN, supra note 58, at 195 (explaining that integrity and leadership,
rather than official powers were source of strength of Masaryk's power).
61. Id. at 199-200.
62. Id. at 195.
63. There is ample precedent in Europe for an indirectly elected president or hereditary monarch to act as official head of state while being constitutionally constrained
from interfering in the daily affairs of government. One has only to look next door.
Indeed, the president of the Federal Republic of Germany plays a considerably smaller
constitutional role than his Czech counterpart. In the German system, the president,
also indirectly elected, is eclipsed by the chancellor to a far greater degree than the

Czech president. On the contrary, President Havel has a much higher profile abroad
than Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, and, even on the domestic scene, the president is
hardly less visible than the prime minister. To take another example, the British parlia
mentary system has reduced Queen Elizabeth II, the official head of state, to a figure-

head with ceremonial and symbolic functions but no real positive or negative political
power.

That was the case in the United States when George Washington rejected an invitation to become a constitutional monarch and later refused to stand for a third term. It
was also the case in France when Charles de Gaulle successfully staged a popular referendum to allow for the direct election of the president in 1962. Finally, it is the case
today in the Czech Republic where Vaclav Havel has settled into a constitutional role

aloof from party politics (de Gaulle also spurned political parties) and above the political fray.
64. 1992 Constitution, supra note 41, arts. 54-66.
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the presidency and the power inherent in the office to manipulate the symbols of state and nation. In this event, it might be
the prime minister whose hands were tied, either rubber stamping the president's decisions or risking public denunciation by
the president for obstructing constitutional processes. It is possible, however, that the passive-role precedent established by President Havel will prevail, at least for a time.
VI. THE SENATE
The 1920 Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature,
consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate.65 Provisions
were made for the Czech Senate in the 1992 Czech Constitution,6 6 but due to political bickering, implementation of the Senate was delayed for more than three years. The voting power of
the soon to be elected Senate is comparable to the Senate of the
1920 Constitution.6 7 Until the elections on November 15-16,
1996, the Chamber of Deputies continued to exercise the powers of the Senate. With its seating, the Senate will exercise its
own powers. 61 On February 21, 1996, the House of Deputies determined that the location of the new Senate would be in three
historic Mala Strana palaces. 69
Senators must be eligible to vote and be over forty years
old.70 The Senate is to be composed of eighty-one members,
elected for six-year terms. 7 One-third of the senators are to be
elected every two years.72 The Senate selects its own chairman
and vice chairman.73
A. Senate Legislative Power
After passage, the House of Deputies is required to send
65. See ANDREW, supra note 7, at 9-10.

66. 1992 Constitution, supra note 41, art. 15(2).
67. See id. art. 44. In the 1920 Constitution, the Senate had some greater legislative clout. Article 44 provided that if three-fourths of the Senate rejected a bill, passage

required three-fifths of the Chamber. Id.
68. See New Parliament to Meet by End of June, CTK National News Wire, Mar. 11,
1996 (discussing Senate elections).
69. Tomas Kellner, Senate Will Have Its Home In a Trio of Historic Mala Strana Palaces,
PRAcUE PosT, Feb. 26, 1996.
70. 1992 Constitution, supra note 41, art. 19(2).
71. Id. art. 16(2).
72. Id. art. 16(2).
73. Id. art. 29(2).
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bills to the Senate.7 4 The Senate has thirty days to accept, reject,
or amend such a bill. 75 Upon return of a bill, the House can
repass the bill by a simple majority of the total number of House
members. 76 An international treaty is passed in the same manner as a legislative bill. 77 The Senate is empowered to act in the
event the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved with respect to matters of some urgency. 78 Apparently, government, including the
prime minister and other ministers, must make these legislative
measures submitted to the Senate.7 9 In other situations, senators
generally offer legislative bills."'
If the Senate passes a measure, it can become law only if the
House of Deputies concurs."1 As a rule, the Senate can pass a
measure by a majority of the senators present."s The Constitution provides that a simple majority of all senators and House
members is required to declare war or to sanction the presence
of foreign troops into Czech hands.8 3 Armed forces may be sent
out of the country only with the approval of both chambers.8 4
The Senate's concurrence is required for certain categories of
law including general election laws, rules of procedure in the
Senate, and laws concerning interaction of the two bodies.8 5
B. Other SenatorialPowers
The Senate has a role in the enactment of constitutional
amendments. 8 6 It also has an important role in the selection of
the president, in that the Chamber and the Senate select the
president 7 by simple majority.8 8 It is noteworthy that if the presidency becomes vacant at a time when the House of Deputies is
74. Id. art.
75. Id. art.
76. Id. art.
77. Id. art.
78. Id. art.
Id. art. 33(2).
79. Id. art.
80. Id. art.
81. Id. art.
82. Id. art.
83. Id. art.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

45.
46(1)-(2).
47(1).
49.
33(1). Certain exceptions are made regarding Senate empowerment.
33(3), (4).
41(2).
33(5).
39(2).
39(3).

43(2).
40.
39(4).
54(2).
58(2).
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dissolved, the chairman of the Senate becomes the president.8 9
Another interesting provision that will soon be rendered ineffectual stipulates that the House cannot be dissolved while it exercises the functions of the Senate. ° Another important provision
is that the presidential power to select constitutional court members requires Senate approval. 91
C. Appraisal of Senate's Powers
It is axiomatic that whoever has power can abuse it. The
Senate is relatively weak compared to the U.S. Senate. Its main
function might be to delay, because a simple majority of House
members may override a rejection by the Senate of a bill. The
House could refer a bill to the Senate passed with only a majority
of those present. Because of the delicate balance in the House
due to a coalition Government, this could serve to defeat a bill in
today's political climate. Commentators have pointed out that
the presence of the Senate can help prevent erratic behavior in
the House.9 2 Moreover, it has been argued that giving traditional presidential powers to the Senate could curtail presiden93
tial power.

VII. PROJECTIONS FOR SUCCESS OF THE
1992 CONSTITUTION
If history is any guide, democratic institutions have a greater
chance of succeeding in the Czech Republic than in any other
Eastern or Central European Country. The era viewed most positively in the Czech Republic was that of the First Republic between 1918 and 1938, according to a poll before the 1968 invasion.9 4 Somehow there is a collective memory of a liberal-democratic political culture. It has been suggested, for example, that
the ideas of President Masaryk extended beyond his tenure in
the First Republic, inspiring those involved in the Prague Spring,
the dissident movement in the late seventies and early eighties,
89. Id. art. 66.
90. Id. art. 106(2)-(3).
91. Id. art. 84(2).
92. See Cepl, supra note 27, at 34.
93. Id. at 34; New Parliamentto Meet ly End ofJune, CTK National News Wire, Mar.
11, 1996.
94. See Nyrop, supra note 1, at 72 (stating that political pluralism was also favored).
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and extending to the democratic revolution in 1989. 95 These
ideas included democracy, pluralism, and freedom of expression.9 6 Moreover, there is a legacy of skilled labor, developed
infrastructure, and industrial tradition.9 7 Democratization in
the 1960s culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968 when only
Soviet armed intervention could reverse the liberalizing moves
of the Dubzek regime.9 8 Later, the Charter 77 movement
echoed this collective memory of things past. There is also some
memory of individual enterprise during the inter-war period,
though perhaps only the older generation remembers it.
The Czechs' cultural orientation has traditionally been one
facing West.9 9 There is, however, a history of tolerance for considerable deviation from the norm in dress and personal expression. At the same time, there is a strong tendency toward conformity, clannishness, and a sense of family privacy. Toleration
is limited; it has not extended to Gypsies, Sudetenland
Germans, 10 0 Jews, 10 1 or Hungarians. All of them have at one
point or another been expelled or threatened with expulsion,
and all have been victims of discrimination at the hands of the
Czechoslovakian majority.
Czech political culture is a product of longtime domination,
first by Austria and then by the Soviet Union. It is asserted, for
example, that the communist culture gave rise to a split in personality, a set of inner conflicts in which one said one thing and
thought another. There was perhaps a self-debasement involved
in this process. 10 The face people offered to officials and their
95. See SKILUNG, supra note 8, at 177 (explaining that subconscious thread of continuity in these events provided by received thought of Masaryk).
96. Id. at 177-78.
97. See Sergio Salani & Jerry Sloan, An Overview of Legal and FinancingAspects for
Doing Business in Hungay, Poland and the Czech Republic, 9 TEMPLE INT'L AND COMP. L. J.
27, 29 (1995). The Czech Republic is deemed attractive for investment because of its
strong industrial base, low wages, large educated labor force, in addition to its democratic tradition and past economic successes. See Wiebel, supra note 9, at 919.
98. See Nyrop, supra note 1, at 158 (explaining that in 1980s there was memory of
political freedom and economic prosperity).
99. See id. at 72 (discussing Western European cultural tradition).
100. Tomas Poledna, Ownership and Economic Structure in Former Czechoslovakia, 21
INT'L Bus. LAWYER 331 (1993). Citizens of German ancestry were expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945 and their property was taken. Id.
101. See SKILUNG, supra note 8, at 81-93. In the early twentieth century anti-Semiticism pervaded Czech political and public life. Id. at 87.
102. See Nathalie Gagnere, The Return of God and the Challenge of Democracy: The
Catholic Church in CentralEasternEurope, 35J. CHURCH AND STATE 859, 865 (1993) (quot-
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real face were often different. A variation on this theme is the
survival technique offered in the Czech classic Good Soldier
Svejk, where a sly, crafty, clever interior is masked by a meek
exterior in which one pretends to be docile and compliant, but
in fact undermines the foreign authority at every turn. The
Czechs are torn between retooling for a fast moving capitalist
oriented future and a tendency to lapse into the more passive
habits of the past.
CONCLUSION
The Czech presidency created under the 1992 Constitution
is indeed weaker than the presidency established in the 1920
Constitution under which Masaryk exercised the powers of the
presidency. Today, effective power rests mainly with the prime
minister. The Havel Presidency, however, is a reminder that the
exercise of power is not only a function of constitutional language, but also of personal inclinations including attitudes toward power itself, moral convictions, and the temperament of a
particular incumbent. President Havel has sought to remain
above the fray. The position President Havel has carved out
within the new political system is more personal than constitutional; it has no counterpart in Czech tradition. There are two
causes of presidential disability in the Czech Republic. One is
found in the constitution itself, the other in the temperament of
the high-minded man who occupies the office.
It is probable that the perception of the many Czechs is correct, that President Havel is not interested in the details of dayto-day administration or in the mundane matters of policy implementation. President Havel apparently did not fight for a strong
presidency when the new constitution was being drafted even
though his unmatched popularity and stature gave him a golden
opportunity to do so. Nonetheless, there is sufficient ambiguity
in the actual language of the constitution to give a popular president ample room to maneuver against a prime minister.
In our view, the real reason for the extreme restraint which
has become the hallmark of the Havel presidency is a personal
idea of what the proper role of a president ought to be. An
equally charismatic president whose approach to politics emphaing Vaclav Havel). Persons in such societies have experienced apathy, intolerance,
widespread alcoholism, corruption, lies, and crimes. Id. at 865.
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sized power over moral persuasion, for example President
Havel's opposite, could undoubtedly have played a more assertive role in governing the country than President Havel has chosen to do.
As the famous first holder of his high office, President Havel
is establishing a precedent which will make it difficult for his successors to do more with the office than he has done. Lacking
President Havel's stature, it is almost certain that they will, in
fact, do less.
The belated seating of the new Senate will fulfill the original
intent of the Constitution. The Senate could provide a safeguard against erratic actions of the House, at least by means of
deliberation and delay which might allow public opinion to
come into play. Given the recent history of authoritarian rule in
Czechoslovakia prior to 1989, the presence of the Senate as a
safeguard against arbitrary government can only be salutary for
the future of Czech democracy.

